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n September 9
th, the United States announced that it was planning a $7.8 billion sale of 13 
Patriot fire units, 72 PAC-3 missiles and a range of related hardware for ground-based air 
defence to Turkey. This decision, some commentators reasoned, was evidence that the US was 
turning to Turkey as an alternative base to the missile defence system (MDS) originally planned in 
Central Europe. Such assessments have proved somewhat off the mark, however. What is on sale to 
the Turks (a system to protect Turkey against short- and medium-range missiles), it turns out, is 
different from what had been on offer to the Czechs and Poles, which was a system designed to 
intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. The announced sale of one system, however, signalled the 
end of the other. On September 17
th, the Obama administration confirmed that it would abandon plans 
for an MDS based in Poland and the Czech Republic.  
Obama’s decision may have come as a relief to those Polish and Czech politicians who were sceptical 
of the MDS to begin with, particularly in the face of opinion polls showing that majorities in each 
country are opposed to the project. To those who believed that the presence of American military 
hardware (and personnel) in Central Europe would act as a deterrent against any belligerent designs by 
Moscow, America’s decision to scrap the offer came as a major disappointment. In Warsaw, the US 
administration’s move was perceived as further evidence – after the lack of visible rewards for Polish 
engagement in Iraq and a few diplomatic snubs – that Poland was slipping down America’s list of 
strategic priorities. Subsequent US proposals to involve Poland in the regional defence system have 
done little to allay such concerns. From the US perspective, ditching plans for a long-range MDS in 
Central Europe and making Turkey an integral part of a new regional defence system seems a matter 
of killing two very big birds with one stone.  
First, it is a question of upgrading Washington’s relationship with Ankara, which still hasn’t recovered 
from the Turkish parliament’s decision in March 2003 to refuse to open a northern front in the 
invasion of Iraq. The installation of a missile defence system would show that there is substance to 
America’s strategic partnership with Turkey – a relationship made all the more significant in view of 
the Obama administration’s urgent need to involve Turkey in an American exit strategy from Iraq.  
Objectively speaking, and especially on the heels of US recognition that the threat from Iran’s short- 
and medium-range missiles is greater than that from its still-undeveloped long-range missiles 
programme, the choice of Turkey as a base for a regional defence system makes plenty of sense. 
Because of its turbulent yet strategically important neighbourhood, Turkey has already been in the 
market for a missile defence shield for years. As early as 1991, during the first Gulf War, Patriot 
missiles were stationed in Turkey under a NATO framework as protection against possible Scud 
attacks from Iraq. The need for a defence shield remains. Turkey, after all, is the only NATO member 
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whose entire territory is already within range of Iranian missiles (Tehran’s newest Shahab-3 missiles 
are said to possess a range of more than 1,300 km).   
Second, the offer of a regional missile defence system to Turkey (to protect against short- and 
medium-range missiles) goes a long way to allay Moscow’s fears, however ill-founded or 
disingenuous, that a Czech- and Polish-based MDS (to intercept long-range missiles, of which Russia 
has plenty) could be directed against Russia. Installing the defence shield in Turkey is a signal that the 
US is willing to accommodate Russian anxieties.   
It is one thing to deliver an anti-ballistic MDS into the hands of the Poles and the Czechs, with whom 
Russia has an uneasy (verging on the poisonous) relationship, and another to entrust a regional defence 
shield to the Turks, with whom Moscow is enjoying an historic rapprochement. The volume of trade 
between the two countries reached $38 billion in 2008, making Russia Turkey’s largest trade partner. 
For years, Russia has been Turkey’s most important energy provider, accounting for 65% of its gas 
imports and 40% of its oil imports. Just over a month ago, on August 5
th, Turkey and Russia signed a 
major deal allowing Gazprom to lay a new gas pipeline – South Stream – across the Black Sea. What 
impact this will have on the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project is still unclear. For reasons of 
economic dependence alone, Turkey has gone to great lengths not to antagonise its eastern neighbour. 
This was apparent during the August 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia, when Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to the dismay of many of his NATO allies (America first and foremost), 
declared that “It would not be right for Turkey to be pushed towards any side of the conflict”.   
In view of the above, Russia could never argue with any degree of credibility that a defence system 
placed in Turkish hands constitutes a threat to its security. And Ankara would make sure not to give 
Russia an excuse to do so. In late 2008 Polish President Lech Kaczynski did just that when he opined 
that the Russian invasion of Georgia was “a very strong argument” in favour of installing an MDS in 
Poland, effectively undermining American assertions that the shield’s exclusive purpose was to ward 
off threats from Iran. What would make Moscow’s complaints sound even more hollow is the fact that 
the Russians have previously discussed selling their own version of a defence shield – in the form of 
S-300 and S-400 systems – to Ankara.  
A Turkish-based shield could even become a bargaining chip in US policy towards Iran, with the 
Americans making it clear to Tehran that they would be ready to sacrifice the project in exchange for 
progress on the Iranian nuclear dossier. Washington would have to take care not to antagonise the 
Turks in the process, however, bearing in mind the sort of damage done to the US-Turkish relationship 
by President Kennedy’s 1962 decision – made without prior consultation with Ankara – to remove US 
Jupiter missiles from Turkey (in exchange for Russia withdrawing its missiles from Cuba).  
Still, no one can say that it will be easy to win the Turks over to the idea of a regional missile defence 
shield. To do so, Erdoğan’s government would have to confront an electorate that is deeply sceptical 
of US policies. Although Turks have warmed to America under Barack Obama, only a meagre 16% 
believe that it is desirable for the US to exert strong leadership in world affairs. Turkey will also have 
to be careful not to antagonise Moscow and Tehran, with whom it has painstakingly constructed 
pragmatic relations over the past decade, as part of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbours” policy. 
Placing US missiles on Turkish territory, inasmuch as it would mean a boost to Ankara’s relations 
with Washington, could become a major political liability for the AKP government, both domestically 
and in the Muslim near-abroad.  
From a broader perspective, the MDS dilemma illustrates an inconvenient truth: that Turkey’s 
sophisticated foreign policy, commendable though it may be, is often strained when it comes to 
responding to fast-changing dynamics or accommodating other regional actors’ conflicting interests. 
As Turkey’s reaction to last summer’s war in Georgia (or this summer’s unrest in Iran) goes to show, 
maintaining a “zero problems” approach in a volatile neighbourhood is no easy task.   
Recent comments by Turkey’s foreign minister show that squaring the purchase of a missile defence 
shield with an increasingly important relationship with Iran might be equally daunting. Turkey’s 
acquisition of an MDS, Ahmet Davutoglu assured, would have “nothing to do with Iran or any other 
country.” Which begs the question: against what – if not Iran “or any other country” – is the shield 
expected to provide defence? Needless to say, Turkey must do a better job of articulating its defence 
posture and its stance vis-à-vis the Iranian missile threat. Attuning the Iranians to the notion that good 
fences sometimes make good neighbours might be a good start.  